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For anyone with intellectual tastes and an interest in tort law, G.
Edward White's Tort Law in America." An Intellectual History is a fasci-
nating book. Professor White combines a lucid style with a stunning
command of legal and other scholarship as he traces the influence of
that scholarship on tort law in the United States. The book's ultimate
effect, however, is ironic. It traces the intellectual effort to hammer out
tort law-so much elegant thought by so many people-but does not
sufficiently come to grips with the disaster that tort law was and is and
may well continue to be, especially in the area of personal injuries.
Professor White starts his chronology, appropriately enough, by
noting that religion, as "a major source of ... communal values,"'
influenced the common law of torts. For example, a nineteenth-cen-
tury decision by the Michigan Supreme Court denied recovery for acci-
dental death because "[tlo the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking
at human life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of
compensating its loss in money is revolting .... ,2
By the mid-nineteenth century "[t]he role of religion as a unifying
force among American intellectuals was considerably diminished
... ."- In the place of religion as the touchstone of thought came
thought itself, in the form of conceptualism-the scientific ordering of
knowledge. That ordering led to the subdivision of tort liability into
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three categories: absolute liability, intentional torts, and negligence. 4
Negligence quickly assumed an overwhelmingly dominant position:5
"torts was, in short, virtually synonymous with negligence."'6
The rise of science, with its passion for classification, was inter-
twined with the rise of specialization and professionalism. This rise in
turn generated "the production of massive conceptualist treatises ' 7 on
torts, among other subjects, and the replacement of legal apprentice-
ship with law school. All of this led to rigorous attempts to organize
rules of tort law in an orderly, predictable manner, with an increasing
refinement of principles. Concomitantly, in the late nineteenth century
these principles reinforced a reluctance to shift the burden of loss in
negligence cases from the injured to the injurer.8
Early in the twentieth century came the rise of legal realism,
which, in its better-known phase, was concerned not so much with how
legal rules are derived as with their effect-whether and how they are
followed in practice.9 "Most of the 'real' rules of law were not reflected
in cases but in patterns of behavior: business practices, the activities of
criminals, the performance of legislative and administrative officials."'10
Realists believed that general abstractions are suspect, that empirical
observation is the key to understanding law, and that contemporary
influences are paramount. Realists thus objected to the proposition, so
dear to conceptualists, that a case represents a broad legal principle.1
Instead, they said, it is just one case, often with little or no legal mean-
ing beyond its own context.' 2 Rather than classifying rules as good or
bad, the later realists saw all rules as illusory. They viewed law as typi-
cally the result of a battle of interests-with one interest prevailing over
the other. "The legal rules affecting water companies were different
from those affecting railroads or coal miners. It was fruitless to genera-
lize beyond the immediacy of the case and the clash of interests that it
posed."' 3
In rejecting quests for universal principles, in seeing the world in a
continuing state of confusing flux, in deeming "contemporary rele-
vance" to be the key to understanding cases, and even more in rejecting
4. Id. 13.
5. See id. 18.
6. Id. 19.
7. Id. 34.
8. Id. 62.
9. Id. 71.
10. Id. 72.
11. Id. 73.
12. Id.
13. Id. 82.
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moral principles as guideposts, the realists came to be seen as advocat-
ing chaos over order, irrationality over rationality, and random data
over theory. Indeed, one could not easily reconcile a rule of law with a
world of no rules, no doctrines, no generalized abstractions. If indeed
realism recognized no moral values, on what basis could realists prefer
the democratic American system over the totalitarian Nazi system?14
At this point realists retreated to a position which made "rational-
ity" the unifying principle in American law. Reason rather than fiat
controlled--exemplified by the requirement that judges render public
decisions, by the separation of powers, and ultimately by elections
themselves. But if government officials, including judges, were as likely
to be irrational as rational, how would it be possible to maintain confi-
dence in law or government? 15
Realists also believed that one understands a legal decision by ask-
ing what social or economic function it serves--that is, what societal
interest is thereby preferred. But can one know in advance how a given
judge or legislator or administrator would balance conflicting interests?
Realists originally believed that one could, by detailed studies of the
behavior of judges and other law makers, make such predictions, but
such efforts came to nought. 16
The solution, such as it was, was the emergence after World War
II of "consensus jurisprudence," consisting of agreement concerning
basic American values such as pluralism, interdependence, and human-
itarian policymaking (an ironic policy, as Professor White points out,
for a profession devoted to advocacy). 17 There was, however, precious
little consensus in tort law: witness the battle between Charles Greg-
ory, Albert Ehrenzwieg, and Fleming James on the one hand, who ad-
vocated that the role of negligence be drastically reduced in personal
injury tort law,' 8 and the many on the other hand who opposed (and
still oppose) such a move. 19
The primary consequence for tort law was a revival of interest in
doctrine. Doctrinal analysis was once again seen as "a source of ration-
ality, predictability and continuity in tort law and other common law
14. Id. 140.
15. Id. 141.
16. Id. 142-43.
17. Id. 145.
18. See C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936);
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered- The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549
(1948); Note [Ehrenzweig], Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Pal-
sgraf Case, 8 U. Cm. L. REV. 729 (1941).
19. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-4uto Com-
pensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 641 (1964).
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subjects. ' 20 The primary dispute about doctrine was "whether tort law
best functioned primarily as an instrument for admonishing currently
undesirable civil conduct or whether tort law ought primarily to be a
means for compensating injured people. '21 The emergence of liability
insurance was a key element in the debate and in the development of
tort law--especially in personal injury cases. Here the fundamental
tension in tort law between the inconsistent admonitory and compensa-
tory functions prominently reasserted itself: the more tort law focused
on wrongdoing by the defendant as a precondition to compensation or
focused on a wrongdoing by the plaintiff as a bar to recovery, the less
often were injured parties compensated.22
The pivotal figure in creating what consensus there was and in try-
ing to bridge the gap between the many different views on tort law,
argues White, was William Prosser. His enormously popular hornbook
and his many law review articles served as intermediaries between
those who wanted to retain negligence as the keystone to tort law and
those who wished to abandon it. He believed that tort doctrine could
adequately deal with accident law by accretion. 23 Professor White,
however, remains unconvinced by Prosser. He observes the chaos
stemming from Prosser's central role in the development of the last
clear chance rule:
Taken as predictive rules the classifications led to absurdities, as
Prosser himself recognized: "the driver who looks carefully and dis-
covers the danger, and is then slow in applying his brakes, may be
liable, while the one who does not look at all, or who has no effective
brakes to apply, may not."24
Even the development of strict liability for malfunctioning products-a
development that Prosser fostered-has resulted in relatively little
change in the law of torts, given the plaintiff's need to prove a defect in
20. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 146.
21. Id. 147.
22. This battle developed primarily between those who wished to stretch tort doctrine to
provide more compensation and those less inclined to do so. See, e.g., Cooperrider, Book Review,
56 U. MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1958).
In identifying those who opposed an overt compensation purpose for tort law, Professor
White states that "no Harvard or Pennsylvania professor, in the years from 1945 to 1970, advo-
cated" emphasizing the compensatory function of torts. White specifically names Robert Keeton
of Harvard and Clarence Morris of Pennsylvania, among others. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 153.
Yet between 1964 and the early 1970s Robert Keeton was the chief advocate of the no-fault com-
pensatory function of tort law, joined by Clarence Morris and James Paul of the University of
Pennsylvania.
23. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 155-57.
24. Id. 160 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 66, at 433 (4th ed. 1971)).
1204 [Vol. 1980:1201
BOOK REVIEW
the product, and the many available defenses, such as misuse.25 White
basically believes that Prosser's work is a reversion to doctrinal analysis
and classification as a means of developing the law. The Restatement of
Torts, for which Prosser was the reporter for many years, is in the opin-
ion of the realists, as White and others have shown, a return to nine-
teenth-century conceptualism.26
In addition to examining Prosser, Professor White focuses on two
judges who have greatly influenced the law of torts: Benjamin Cardozo
of New York and Roger Traynor of California. Surprisingly, White
thinks, both these men did rather poorly when dealing with negligence.
"Tort law, as dominated by the negligence principle, revealed itself to
Cardozo . . . as an amorphous, evolving mass, its status as a moral
force ambiguous and ephemeral." 27 In addition, Professor White very
trenchantly exposes Cardozo's inconsistency in his two most famous
cases-Ma cPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 28 and Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad79-both involving negligence.
The theory of negligence chartered by Cardozo from MacPher-
son to Palsgraf.. doubled back on itself. In MacPherson Cardozo
extracted negligence from a relational context (contract) and identi-
fied it with a universal duty of care, subject to vague limitations. In
Palsgraf he recast negligence in a relational context. The chief limi-
tation on the negligence principle became, once again, its context. A
civil obligation to take care not to injure one's neighbor was not lim-
ited to certain statuses or occupations, but its existence was nonethe-
less dependent on the relationship between the prospective obligor
and the person he or she had injured. Within a span of twelve years
the negligence principle had, theoretically, been dramatically ex-
panded and potentially dramatically limited by the same judge.30
Professor White criticizes Justice Traynor for Traynor's uninspired
treatment of negligence cases-unlike any of the imaginative ap-
proaches he took in developing strict liability in products liability cases.
Whereas Justice Traynor's activist and innovative opinions in Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.31 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products32 re-
cast thinking about an entire area of tort law, Professor White finds
Traynor's negligence opinions relatively traditional-"far more cau-
25. See R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 108 (1969); J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT
TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 13-16 (1975).
26. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 81-83, 154-55. See also Arnold, Leon Green-An .4ppreciation,
43 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1948).
27. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 136.
28. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
29. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
30. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 127.
31. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P. 2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
32. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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tious and doctrinaire."33
Perhaps the reason that White finds the two most prominent
judges of torts cases to, be inadequate is that the negligence criterion
itself is inadequate. Prosser liked to speak of torts as consisting of exer-
cises in "social engineering. ' 34 But only a Rube Goldberg would have
concocted this incredibly expensive, dilatory, wasteful, dangerous
tool. 35
Turning from the past to the present and the future, White next
examines what he terms neoconceptualism-the key feature of which is
its "relentless preoccupation with abstract theory. ' 36 He states:
Rather than applying an approved general methodology to a particu-
lar area of law, as the "typical" article of the 1950s did, legal scholars
of the 1970s often seek to apply an unorthodox methodology to a
broad area of legal relationships. Their claim is that this application
can produce fresh perspectives, which may ultimately lead to a new
theory of a field of law. Their interest seems less in tracing the theory
through its particularized applications than in stimulating others to
consider the perspectives of the theory itself.37
This perspective is stunningly different from that of the realists, "whose
proponents ultimately seemed interested in narrower and more pene-
trating analyses of individual cases. By contrast, an inquiry into the
unarticulated premises of tort law leads one away from case analysis to
the realm of social theory. '38
In particular, White discusses the works of Richard Posner, Guido
Calabresi, George Fletcher, and Richard Epstein. He finds that all
their attempts to enunciate comprehensive approaches to tort law are
flawed because each approach requires overly complex criteria and
new variables that might be even more cumbersome than the present
criteria for negligence.39 For example, White distrusts the comprehen-
sive application of economic theory to the tort system urged by Posner
and Calabresi.40
33. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 190.
34. Id. 157. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 17 (1st ed. 1941).
35. For a description critical of the tort system in operation in auto accidents, see J.
O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 1-93 (1971); J.
O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND: TEACHING MATERIALS ON
COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS AND AILMENTS IN MODERN SOCIETY 99-221 (1975). For a
description criticizing the operation of the tort system in products liability and medical malprac-
tice cases, see J. O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 12-28, 29-47.
36. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 212.
37. Id.
38. Id. 218.
39. Id. 229-30.
40. Id. 230.
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After thus describing his frustrations with the various intellectual
theories about tort law, Professor White proceeds to predict where tort
law is headed. Routine unintentional injury, he says, should be en-
tirely removed from the tort system by a no-fault compensation system
like those established for industrial and auto-related injuries.41 But
Professor White is wary of using no-fault compensation for more seri-
ous cases because he "cannot reconcile no-fault as a comprehensive
principle with [his] interest in using tort law as a device for censure and
punishment." 42 Earlier in the book, however, White acknowledges the
well-established view among tort scholars that "[w]ith the addition of
liability insurance tort law had become primarily a compensation sys-
tem designed to distribute the cost of injuries throughout society effi-
ciently and fairly; [under this view, tort law] should no longer be
regarded principally as a system designed to deter and punish blame-
worthy conduct. '43
As to torts for which censure may be desirable, White resists any
urge to posit comprehensive principles:
It may be that the momentum of neoconceptualism is suffi-
ciently advanced that the short-term future of tort law will necessar-
ily be associated with the formulation and refinement of some
comprehensive theory of liability, whose role in twentieth-century
history may be analogous to that of the negligence principle in its
years of dominance. A theme of this book has been the power of
ideas as causative agents, and I should not want to minimize the po-
tential capacity of neoconceptualism to reshape the subject of torts.
But if it is not too late, I should like to resist such a tendency."4
Basically, White believes that the law of torts is too diffused to be gov-
erned by any one unifying concept. He closes by noting that despite all
scholarly efforts, the field of torts remains perplexing, disorderly, and
inconsistent: "[T]he recurrent urge among scholars and judges to make
tort law comprehensible, and the recurrent capacity of the subject to
retain its incomprehensibility, is symbolic of a more basic interaction
between law and human behavior in American society. ''45
I come away from Professor White's superb book discouraged.
My own estimate is that personal injury cases make up eighty-five to
ninety percent of tort cases. Is it inevitable, as Professor White asserts,
41. Id. 235. For a discussion of the difficulties in doing so for other than auto accidents, see
J. O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 70-96; J. O'CONNELL, THE LAwsUrr LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAW-
YERS WIN 181-85 (1979). But for discussions of the means of doing so despite the difficulties, see
id. 186-227.
42. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 239.
43. Id. 149-50.
44. Id. 233.
45. Id. 243.
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that tort law, especially that which applies to personal injury, will re-
main the dreadful mess it is? If our grandfathers-with far less actua-
rial data to go on--could scrap tort law seventy years ago for the bulk
of accidents then happening (namely industrial accidents) in favor of a
comprehensive system of workers' compensation, can it be beyond the
capacity of this generation to do so for other accidents, including non-
routine ones?
Significantly, nowhere in Professor White's book does he discuss
workers' compensation. While no one would pretend that workers'
compensation is perfect, no sane person would abolish it and return to
the tort system for industrial accidents.46 This is not to accuse Profes-
sor White of advocating the repeal of workers' compensation. Rather,
it is to emphasize that he-like many torts scholars-completely ig-
nores it. Nevertheless, workers' compensation presented an early test
to the conflicting functions of accident law-compensation and admo-
nition. Professor Jeremiah Smith of the Harvard Law School predicted
in 1914, when the adoption of workers' compensation law was being
debated, that "in the end, one or the other of the. . . theories is likely
to prevail . . . . [I]t seems safe to say that the basic principles of
[workers' compensation law and the common law of torts] are irrecon-
cilable. They cannot both be wholly right, or both wholly wrong. '47
Of course, Smith has been proved wrong. Workers' compensation
and the common law of torts not only have co-existed, but also have
managed to ignore each other even after no-fault auto insurance was in
effect in fifteen states. Why this inconsistent co-existence prevails is a
fascinating question that Professor White indirectly answers.
A basic reason for turning to no-fault compensation and away
from traditional negligence liability was and is the vast amount of un-
remedied injury in our society. The compensatory purpose of tort law
46. A 1972 study by the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
strongly criticized the way workers' compensation operates, but went on to state that "we have
discussed the implications of abolishing workmen's compensation and reverting to the negligence
suits, a remedy abandoned some 50 years ago. This option is still inferior to workmen's compen-
sation .. " NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 25
(1972). The report characterized tort liability suits as "a drawn-out, costly, and uncertain process
that was dismissed long-ago as a means of dealing with occupational injuries and diseases." Id.
45. It is true that workers' compensation benefits are occasionally and haphazardly supplemented
by third-party tort claims against, for example, a supplier of machinery to an employer. A better
system of compensation is that now being proposed in Congress: to increase workers' compensa-
tion benefits in return for making those benefits the sole remedy for injured employees.
O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liability Problems: Workers' Compensation
as a Sole Remedyfor Employees with an Employer's Remedy Against Third Parties, 1976 INS. L.J.
683.
47. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REv. 344, 363, 368 (1914).
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has long competed with tort's admonitory function. No-fault, more
strongly directed toward compensation, competes with a weaker ad-
monitory function (weaker because recoveries in most tort actions are
now being paid out of a vast pool of impersonal insurance). Professor
White's own words, applicable to the first battle-between the compen-
satory and the admonitory function of torts-apply equally to the fault
versus no-fault dispute.
The compensatory features of tort law came to be seen as significant
...once American society came to be perceived of as an interdepen-
dent entity whose members were responsible for one another. If the
lives of injured persons affected the lives of others, so that injuries
were a social "problem," then compensating people for injuries be-
came a paramount policy goal. The tort system was one existing
compensation device; it had the virtue of having survived over time
and of allegedly conditioning compensation on proof of blamewor-
thiness; it was "there" to be made into a more effective compensation
system through liability insurance and other techniques for spreading
and shifting the costs of injuries.48
Indeed, the tort system is still "there" to be made into a more effective
compensation device through various no-fault systems.
On the other hand, Professor White says he is "not unhappy with
the current 'chaotic' state of tort law," because he finds "such chaos an
antidote to the tendency of conceptualist thought to elevate scholars to
positions of undue prominence."49 White expresses his fascination
with "the capacity of law in America to resist serving as an orderly
system," and one hears his resigned sigh that "[slo long as tort law, or
any other area of law, deals with human problems and is made and
enforced by humans it will embody dissonances and absurdities
"50
But can we afford these incongruities given the current inadequa-
cies of personal injury law in the United States? The inefficiency of tort
law in personal injury cases, as it pays quixotic benefits in a disorderly
way, is a grave social cost borne primarily by the tort victim. 51 There is
considerable evidence, however, that a well-drafted no-fault law does
48. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 232. See also Cooperrider, Book Review, 22 WAYNE L. REv.
189, 194-95 (1975).
49. TORT LAW IN AMERICA 243.
50. Id.
51. Professor Patrick Atiyah of Oxford, a leading British torts scholar, recently made this
point:
[T]he problem... [centers] around those accident victims who currently receive no tort
recovery.
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in fact abate the evils of the tort system in personal injury cases.5 2
Yet Professor White's scholarly, lucid book, with its prediction of
the continuance of the "absurdities" of tort law, is difficult to dismiss,
for White is so bright he just may be right.
. . . [T]he tendency is usually to help more of these people, and to do so more generously as
time goes on. . . . Are we going to help these people, by expansion of tort law, or by expanding
no-fault compensation programs?
It may be said that we can do both, and no doubt this is true up to a point. Nevertheless,
given the huge administrative costs of the tort system, and the extraordinary generosity of its pain
and suffering awards, it must be recognized that every expansion of tort law uses resources totally
out of proportion to the numbers assisted by that expansion. Looking again at [British] figures
• . . we find that some 175 million pounds in administrative costs and some 130 million pounds in
pain and suffering awards are used in the process of compensating pecuniary losses strictly worth
65 or 70 million pounds. If we could find a no-fault compensation system with an administrative
cost ratio not exceeding 10 percent of pay-outs-by no means an unreasonable ambition-and if
we were willing to contemplate the elimination of compensation for pain and suffering, we could
thus probably compensate, without additional costfour accident victims for every one compen-
sated today. ... If we were willing to include ceilings and threshholds as well, there is no doubt
that we could quite easily afford to compensate a significant proportion of the pecuniary losses
suffered by perhaps six or seven or eight accident victims for every one protected by the tort
system.
• . . The times may be unpropitious but I will venture the prophesy [sic] that in fifty years
time people will look back with some horror on tort law as a means of compensation which sur-
vived too long.
Atiyah, No Fault Compensatiorn" A Question That WillNot GoAway, 54 TULANE L. REV. 271, 290-
93 (1980).
Another British study indicating the counterproductive effect of a tort system on the attitudes
of accident victims is Lloyd-Bostock, Common Sense Morality and Accident Compensation, 1980
INS. L.J. 331. The results of this study appear to apply throughout the common law world, includ-
ing the United States. For American studies tending to confirm the Lloyd-Bostock results, see A.
CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ, & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS
AND PAYMENTS ch. 8 (1964); SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH,
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, PUBLIC ATrITUDES TOWARD AUTO INSURANCE, (1970); O'Connell &
Wilson, Public Opinion on No-Fault Auto Insurance: A Survey of the Surveys, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
307.
52. O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REV.
23 (1977); O'Connell & Beck, An Update ofthe Surveys on the Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws,
1979 INS. L.J. 129.
